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primary schools. However, local ethnic diversity is not related to average school test score
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11 Introduction
Recent economic research suggests that ethnically diverse societies may be prone to slow economic
growth.1  This issue is particularly important for sub-Saharan African countries, which as a group are
both the poorest and the most ethnically diverse countries.  Easterly and Levine [1997] find that
national ethnic diversity may explain much of cross-country differences in public policies, political
instability, and other factors associated with economic growth from 1960 to 1990, and conclude that
ethnic diversity has been a principal cause of African economic failure in the post-colonial period.2
This paper explores the relationship between ethnic diversity and local primary school funding in a
poor, rural and ethnically diverse region of western Kenya. Important public primary school
investments – including books, desks, and classrooms – are locally funded in Kenya. The empirical
results of this paper may contribute to the current debate on the sources of poor African economic
performance, since primary school quality is an important determinant of human capital accumulation
in poor countries, and human capital accumulation is associated with subsequent economic growth.3
A lack of cooperation between ethnic groups may in theory lead them to undervalue common
public enterprises like schools, or be unwilling to fund projects that will predominantly benefit other
groups.  Ethnic heterogeneity may affect many important collective action situations, including
involvement in community organizations, and political participation.  Exploring the role that ethnic
diversity plays in a particular collective action problem – in this case, the funding of primary schools –
may contribute to understanding its impact in related settings.
The estimation strategy addresses the possibility of endogenous pupil mobility between schools.
The hierarchy of geographic areas in Kenya in terms of size is province (largest area), district, division,
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 Alesina and Drazen [1991] address the paralysis of divided governments in a “war of attrition” framework. Benhabib and
Rustichini [1996] discuss how conflict between social groups may lead to a political growth trap. Alesina and Spolaore
[1997] examine the role of cultural heterogeneity in nation formation and disintegration.
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 Collier and Gunning [1999] and Sachs and Warner [1997] discuss other explanations for African economic failure.
3
 Barro [1997] and Krueger and Lindahl [1998] estimate the relationship between schooling and economic growth.
2and zone (smallest area), and the 97 schools in the current study are located within two geographic
districts, eight divisions, and 22 geographic zones, in Western province, Kenya.  Zonal ethnic diversity
is used as an instrumental variable for school-level ethnic diversity, since pupils’ mobility between
schools (generally by foot) makes school-level ethnic diversity endogenous. Indicator variables for the
geographic divisions are included to control for variation in both income and the taste for education
across regions, and the relationship between ethnic diversity and school funding is then identified
using the variation in school outcomes across zones within a geographic division.  Ethnic composition
is stable in this area of Kenya, being tied to traditional group lands, and is plausibly exogenous.
Empirically, local ethnic diversity is robustly associated with sharply lower local school funding,
less parental participation in school affairs, and fewer desks, latrines, and classrooms per pupil in
ninety-seven rural Kenyan primary schools.  The drop in local school funding associated with median
school ethnic diversity is approximately 30 percent of average local school funding. The effect of
ethnic diversity on local school funding and educational investments is robust to the inclusion of a
range of socioeconomic, demographic, and school quality controls.
Other researchers have found a similar relationship between ethnic diversity and school funding in
the United States.  Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly [1997] find that high levels of ethnic diversity are
associated with up to 25 percent lower local school funding, and lower funding for other public goods,
in U.S. municipalities.  Poterba [1996] finds that an increase in the share of ethnic minorities in the
school-aged child population from zero to fifty percent – holding other factors constant – is associated
with a 27 percent drop in local school spending per child.  Goldin and Katz [1997] argue that public
secondary schooling expanded slowly in ethnically diverse U.S. school districts from 1910 to 1940.
The model presented in Section 3 is related to the recent theoretical literature examining school
choice and funding decisions (Benabou [1993]; Durlauf [1996]; Epple and Romer [1991]; Fernandez
and Rogerson [1996]).  These existing models assume costless mobility between jurisdictions and
active land markets, unrealistic assumptions for many less developed countries; focus on income and
3ability differences as driving forces for sorting into separate communities; and feature school
segregation as the only stable sorting equilibrium.
The theoretical goal of this paper is to model the primary school funding and school choice process
in rural Africa. Three assumptions in particular distinguish the model from previous theoretical work.
First, pupils are locally mobile by foot but not by residence due to frictions in rural land markets and
the cost of moving across ethnic boundaries.  Second, ethnic diversity – rather than income inequality
– is the source of agent heterogeneity, and the dimension along which pupils sort. Third, school
educational quality is determined both by endogenous pupil composition and by an exogenous quality
component representing the important role that headmasters play in the success of rural primary
schools.
Since distinct ethnic groups have different educational instruction preferences – such as the
language in which classes are conducted – households may face a trade-off between choosing a school
for its educational quality, or for its ethnic composition.  Ethnic integration or segregation may result
depending on the size of these opposing effects.  The model’s empirical implications for the
relationship between ethnic diversity, pupil mobility, and local school funding levels are tested using
the data from rural western Kenya.
The paper is structured as follows: the setting in western Kenya is described in Section 2, the
theory is presented in Section 3, and the empirical results discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes.
Appendix A contains all tables, and Appendix B is the mathematical appendix.
2 The setting
2.1 Primary schools in Busia and Teso districts, Western province, Kenya
Kenya’s Busia and Teso districts are agricultural regions in Kenya’s Western province, bordered by
Uganda to the west and Lake Victoria to the south.  Busia and Teso districts are mediocre in terms of
educational attainment: in 1995, Busia ranked 26th of 50 Kenyan districts on national primary-school
4exams. (Glewwe, et al.  [1998]).  In 1996, the original Busia district was split in two: Teso district is
the northern part of the original Busia district, and Busia district is the southern part.  (The 1995 exam
results are for the combined district.) The combined population of Busia and Teso districts in 1989 was
420,000, and their total area 1,819 square kilometers.4
The material poverty of primary schools in Busia and Teso is striking: few classrooms for
younger pupils have desks, so children often sit on the dirt floor; pupil textbooks are rare, and chalk is
in short supply; classes are sometimes held outside under a tree for lack of permanent classroom
structures.
The national Kenya Ministry of Education regulates the primary school curriculum, administers
national examinations, and hires, transfers, and pays teachers. Local school committees composed
principally of parents raise funds for books, desks, chalk, and classrooms.  Although teacher salaries
paid by the central government account for most primary school spending – local school funding
makes up only ten percent of total expenditures on teacher salaries on average, according to the
author’s calculations – a reduction in local inputs could have an important impact on educational
output if local inputs and teacher inputs are complements in educational production.
Most local school funds are collected in the form of fees which parents pay to the school
headmaster.  Annual school fees ranged from 200-500 Kenya shillings (7-17 U.S. dollars) per family in
1995.  The collection of school fees entails a complicated process of negotiation between the generally
cash-strapped parents and the headmaster, who threatens to suspend the pupils who are late with fees.
The second source of local primary school funding – accounting for approximately one third of
local funding in Busia (Table 5) – are village fundraisers called harambees in Swahili, at which parents
and other community members publicly pledge their financial support for the school.  Harambees are
an important source of public finance in Kenya, accounting for 40 percent of local expenditures on
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5primary schools and other local public goods; nearly 90 percent of Kenyans claim to have participated
in at least one harambee (Wilson [1992]).
2.2 Data
Detailed financial and demographic data for ninety-seven of the 333 primary schools in Busia and
Teso districts were collected from pupil, school, and teacher questionnaires in early 1996, as baseline
information for the Dutch non-governmental organization International Christian Support Fund’s (ICS)
School Assistance Programme.  Primary schools in towns, market centers and wealthier rural areas
were excluded from the assistance program, leaving a sample of poor rural primary schools.
The pupil questionnaire focuses on pupils’ schooling background and family characteristics. 6,626
pupil questionnaires were administered to all grade six through eight pupils (ages twelve to eighteen)
present on the day of questionnaire administration.  Younger pupils were excluded from the
questionnaire because of their limited reading and writing skills. In total, 97 school questionnaires and
861 teacher questionnaires were also administered in early 1996.  School questionnaires – filled by
schoolmasters with the assistance of a trained enumerator – contain detailed information on school
finances and characteristics. Teacher questionnaires focus on teacher qualifications and teaching
techniques, and were completed by the teachers themselves. School district examination results were
provided by the Busia District Education Office.
The survey enumerators believe that responses from the school questionnaire are the most reliable
of the three questionnaires, with teacher responses also generally reliable, but pupil responses often
inaccurate.  Fortunately, the response to the question on pupil ethnic affiliation is likely to suffer from
less response error than other questions. Table 1 in Appendix A describes the data in greater detail.
2.3 Ethnicity
The largest ethnic groups in Busia and Teso districts are Luhya, Teso, and Luo.  Table 2 presents the
proportion of each group in the pupil sample.  The Tesos and Luos are Nilotic groups with pastoralist
6traditions, and the Luhyas are Bantu cultivators composed of the Khayo, Marachi, Nyala, and Samia
subtribes, among others.5 It is unclear if Luhya subtribes should be considered a single ethnic group,
since certain Luhya dialects are mutually unintelligible (Grimes [1996]), there are historical rivalries
between subtribes, and the concept of a Luhya group is recent, originating in the 1950’s.  In the
empirical analysis, I consider ethnic diversity measures in which Luhya subtribes are considered
distinct groups, as well as measures in which Luhyas are aggregated.
There is no clear pattern of ethnic socioeconomic stratification in rural Busia and Teso districts.
Table 2 indicates that levels of parental educational attainment, and latrine and iron roof ownership are
similar for different ethnic groups in this area.
Although relations between ethnic groups in this area are peaceful, the author’s observations
suggest that ethnic minorities are often treated with suspicion in the rural communities of western
Kenya, discouraging household residential mobility across traditional ethnic boundaries.  Moreover,
there is considerable anecdotal evidence of ethnic tension on school committees in western Kenya, as
illustrated by the case of Matumbai Primary School, one of the most ethnically diverse schools in the
study.  In recent years, many parents in Matumbai have refused to participate in funding the parent-
teacher association or to attend school meetings when the elected chairman of the parent teacher
association is not a member of their ethnic group.  Perhaps as a result of such ethnic tensions, annual
per pupil local school funding in Matumbai is only one-third of average funding in the area, and no
permanent classrooms have been constructed; most classes take place under a tree.6
Following Easterly and Levine [1997], I use ethno-linguistic fractionalization as the principal
empirical measure of ethnic diversity.  Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is the probability that two
people randomly drawn from the population are from distinct groups.  Formally,
ETHNIC ≡ 1 – ∑i (Proportion of Ethno-linguistic groupi in the population)2 (1)
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 Other Luhya subtribes in Busia and Teso districts include the Bukusu, Dakho, Kabras, Marama, and Sukha. Other non-
Luhya ethnic groups in this area include the Kikuyu, Masaai, Saboat, Somali, Tachoni, and Taita.
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 I thank Mary Kay Gugerty, Sylvie Moulin and Robert Namunyu for their observations on this and other issues in Kenya.
7Ethno-linguistic fractionalization among sample pupils is 0.82 when Luhya subtribes are
considered separate ethnic groups (ETHNIC1), and 0.48 if the Luhya subtribes are aggregated
(ETHNIC2).  There is considerable variation in ethno-linguistic fractionalization across schools: while
median school-level ETHNIC1 is 0.27, ETHNIC1 is greater than 0.70 in five schools and less than 0.05
in five schools.  Local ethnic diversity is not significantly related to the year of school founding, the
density of primary schools in the area, or the school population (regressions not shown). Most primary
schools in Busia and Teso districts were founded in the 1960s and 1970s, often with the assistance of
Christian missionary groups.
2.4 Pupil mobility and land markets
Pupils in Busia often transfer between primary schools in search of better quality education and lower
school fees. Nearly half of the pupils in the sample have attended more than one primary school, and
eighteen percent are currently attending a school that is not the closest school to their home (Table 2).
Students not attending the school closest to their home are called transfer students. Table 3 indicates
that the proportion of transfer students is large even in geographically isolated schools, suggesting that
many pupils walk considerable distances to school.
Table 4 presents the proportion of transfer students (in grades 6 to 8) that are not from the school’s
dominant ethnic group, and suggests that pupils often travel to schools in which their ethnic group is
not in the majority.  Although Table 4 overstates the proportion of students who choose to become
ethnic minority transfer students – some students do not live within walking distance of a school in
which their group is dominant – ethnically mixed pupil flows are clearly the norm in western Kenya.
The land sales market is generally thin in poor countries (Ray [1998]), including Kenya. The thin
land market and the inability to sell traditional family and subtribal lands without prior community
approval continue to limit residential mobility in rural Kenya (Platteau [1999]). Communal rather than
8individual property rights to land were traditional in western Kenya before British colonization, and
explicit land sales were rare (Leo [1984]).
3 A theory of ethnic divisions, mobility and school funding
The theory builds on Alesina, Baqir and Easterly’s [1997] model of public goods funding in ethnically
diverse settings.  The model examines school choice and funding decisions when distinct ethnic groups
have different educational preferences; when exogenous differences in educational quality across
schools are important; and when pupil mobility between schools is costly. These characteristics
distinguish the model from existing theories of mobility and public goods funding, and may more
realistically portray the school funding process in many less developed countries.
3.1 The set-up
The decision-making unit is the household. There are two ethnic groups, A and B, and each household
belongs to one ethnic group.  Households are distributed among two geographically disjoint areas,
Area 1 and Area 2, and each area has one school, School 1 and School 2, respectively. The number of
schools is fixed.7
Each area contains a continuum of households of unit measure, and one child from each
household attends school. Households choose the school that their child attends.  Households are either
A households from Area 1 (A1), B households from Area 1 (B1), A households from Area 2 (A2), or B
households from Area 2 (B2).  The proportion of A households in Area 1 (Area 2) is δ1,0 (δ2,0).
Assume Area 1 is dominated by A households (δ1,0 > ½), Area 2 is dominated by B pupils (δ2,0 < ½),
and each group has the same majority in its “home” area: δ1,0 = 1 – δ2,0.
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 Founding a new primary school in Kenya requires obtaining government approval – which may be time consuming – as
well as the cost of classroom construction and textbook purchases.  I assume that this cost is large enough in the model that
ethnic minority groups choose not to establish additional schools in their home area.
9Figure 1:
Distribution of households
A1        B2
         
 B1 A2
      Area 1 Area 2
All households receive identical exogenous income, y.  This is a one good economy, and
income can be used for education spending, g, or private consumption, c, such that y = c + g. Each
household in a school receives educational production gα if each pays g in school fees.8  Educational
output is concave in school funding, α ∈ [0,1], since basic educational investments – like learning to
read – may have the highest future payoffs (Psacharopoulos [1994]).
Households vote on the funding level and the type of educational instruction in the school they
have chosen.  The policy space of educational instruction is S = [0,1].  In the context of Kenyan
primary schools, educational preferences might relate to the language of instruction, or the language in
which the headmaster conducts parent teacher association meetings.9  Household utility is decreasing
in the difference between actual school instruction and the household’s ideal.  All A (B) households
have identical preferences for the ideal type of educational instruction, sA ∈ S  (sB ∈ S).  The difference
in ideal instruction types between ethnic groups is σ ≡ |sA – sB|, a measure of ethnic polarization.
The proportion of A pupils in School 1 (School 2) after households make school choice
decisions is δ1 (δ2), and ethno-linguistic fractionalization in School m is γm  = 2⋅δm⋅(1-δm), m ∈ {1, 2}.
Households’ school choice decisions determine school ethnic composition (γ), and ethnic composition
may affect both the type and level of school funding, which in turn determine school choice decisions.
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 Local primary education in Kenya has characteristics of a private good, since children whose parents do not pay school
fees are suspended from school.
9
 Younger pupils are taught in their vernacular (tribal) language in Kenya. Starting in grade four, classes are conducted in
English.  Fluency in Swahili or English is not universal among parents in rural western Kenya.
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Congestion effects from large pupil populations are not considered in the model, although they could
be introduced without changing the qualitative nature of the theoretical results.
The effect of ethnic diversity on educational production is represented by f(γ).  f′(γ) < 0
corresponds to a negative effect of diversity on educational production, for example if conflict between
ethnic groups disrupts school meetings or classroom learning.  A positive diversity effect, f′(γ) > 0,
could result from the beneficial exchange of ideas among people with different cultural backgrounds.
 The quality of the school’s learning environment, which may reflect the motivation of the
school headmaster and teachers, affects the efficiency of educational provision.  Quality is represented
by the exogenous random variable ε ∈ [0,1].  Taking into account school quality (ε), the type of
educational instruction (s), and ethnic diversity (γ), effective educational production for household i is:
ε⋅f(γ)⋅[1 – |s – s(i)|]⋅gα  (2)
Effective educational production can be thought of as the benefit of education in terms of discounted
future income.  School funds are utilized more efficiently for household i as school quality improves,
as ethnic cooperation increases, and as educational instruction approaches the household’s ideal.
Equation 2 assumes that local school funding, headmaster quality, and ethnic cooperation are
complements in educational production. This may be appropriate in settings like rural Kenya where
ethnic tension paralyzes school committees, and where the headmaster’s failure to stem teacher
absenteeism reduces the efficiency of other educational investments.
Each pupil can costlessly attend the school in her home area, but travelling to the other school
requires a payment ∆⋅ω, where ∆ ≥ 0 is the cost per unit traveled and ω is a Uniform[0,1] random
variable representing distance to the school.  This travel cost may be thought of as the cost of walking
to the distant school, or as transactions costs in the local land sales market. Households have the
following utility function, where I is an indicator variable that equals one if the pupil travels to the
distant school:
11
Definition 1: Uωtn(m) is utility for a type (tn, ω) ∈ {A1, A2, B1, B2} x [0,1] child in School m ∈ {1,2}.
Uωtn(m) = Effective education + Consumption – Travel cost (3)
 = εm⋅f(γm)⋅[1 – |sm – st|]⋅gmα + (y – gm) – ∆⋅ω⋅I
Agents have rational expectations and parameter values are common knowledge.  The timing is:
t = 1: Households observe school qualities (ε1, ε2), simultaneously make school choice decisions, and
pay the travel cost, if necessary. The travel cost is sunk, and the school choice is final.10
t = 2: Majority voting among parents in each school on the level of funding (g) and the type of
educational instruction (s), in that order.11
t = 3: Households receive income, pay school fees, and consume the education and private goods.
The model is solved working backwards.  Given the level of school funding, the majority
ethnic group in the school sets the educational instruction type to its ideal. The majority group sets the
level of school funding to maximize the utility of a representative member, taking into account the type
of educational instruction that will be chosen, as well as school quality and the level of ethnic diversity
in the school. The maximization problem faced by majority group households is:
Maxg  ε⋅f(γ)⋅gα – g + y (4)
The solution is:
g(γ)* = [α⋅ε⋅f(γ)](1/(1-α)) (5)
The principal insight of this solution is that parents are willing to spend more on school funding
when educational investments are more productive, for example when there is a better quality
headmaster, or more cooperation across ethnic groups.  Although g corresponds most closely to school
fees in the context of Kenyan primary schools, Equation 5 may be understood as a reduced form
relationship between educational quality and school funding appropriate in a variety of school finance
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 The assumption of a sunk travel cost is realistic in western Kenya, since neither the annual school fee nor the cost of a
uniform particular to a school is refundable if the child transfers to another school during the school year.
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 This voting order resembles the school funding process in western Kenya: school committees first set the level of school
fees, and then decide how to spend the funds. This voting order also allows me to avoid issues of multidimensional voting. I
restrict attention to equilibria in which households vote sincerely (alternatively, play weakly dominant strategies), which
eliminates a class of equilibria generated by the fact that infinitesimal households’ payoffs are invariant to their vote.
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settings.  For example, if harambee contributions are higher when educational investments are more
productive, all subsequent theoretical results also hold for community fundraisers.
For simplicity, I consider the case of y > g(γ)*, income levels are high enough – alternatively,
credit markets function efficiently enough – for households to afford the optimal primary school fee.
However, the theoretical insights hold if this assumption is relaxed.  For example, at the corner
solution g1 = g2 = y for low levels of household income, effective educational production remains an
increasing function of εm, f(γm), and 1 –  |sm – s(i)|.
Assumption 1: ε1 > ε2
Assumption 2: 1 – α – σ > 0
Assumption 3:  δ1 = ½ ⇒ s1 = sA
  δ2 = ½ ⇒ s2 = sB
Assumption 1 means School 1 has a more favorable learning environment, without loss of
generality. Assumption 2 implies that higher school funding always translates into higher utility.
Assumption 3 means that in the event of a tie in voting in School 1 (School 2), A (B) households – the
majority in Area 1 (Area 2) – implement their preferred instruction type.
Assumption 4: UωA1(1) > UωA1(2), ∀ ω ∈ [0,1]
Assumption 5: δ1 ≥ ½
Assumptions 4 and 5 rule out equilibria in which A pupils travel to School 2 because they
expect B pupils to become a majority in School 1.  The equilibria ruled out may not be stable, if pupils
incur travel costs that would be avoided by coordination on a similar equilibrium with less mobility.
Assumptions 3 and 5 together imply that the school instruction type in School 1 (School 2) is sA (sB),
the preferred educational instruction type in Area 1 (Area 2).
3.2 A simple solution with zero travel costs and f(γ)=1
13
The travel cost ∆=0 and f=1 to simplify the solution; they are reintroduced in Section 3.3.  Equilibrium
utility outcomes for type B2 are presented below, where equilibrium spending in School m is denoted
gm = [αεm]1/(1-α).  If a type B2 student travels to School 1, her utility is:
UB2(1)  = ε1 ⋅ (1 – σ)⋅g1α –  g1 + y (6)
= g1⋅(1 – α – σ )/α + y
If she attends School 2, her utility is:
UB2(2) =  g2⋅(1 – α)/α  + y (7)
The school choice decision is determined by differencing Equations 6 and 7:
UB2(1) – UB2(2) = (g1 – g2)(1/α – 1) – g1(σ /α) (8)
The first term is the benefit of attending School 1 in terms of school funding, which is positive in this
case since ε1 > ε2, and f = 1.  The second term is the cost of School 1’s non-ideal educational
instruction type (s1 = sA ≠ sB) for a group B pupil. All B2 students choose School 1 when the gap in
educational preferences between groups is small, relative to the difference in quality between schools:
 (1 – α)(1 –  (ε2/ε1)1/(1-α)) > σ (9)
This equilibrium is called the Magnet Outcome, because students from both ethnic groups are drawn to
the higher quality school.  A2 pupils always travel to School 1 in this simple case, since they prefer
both the higher funding and the instruction type in School 1.
If the ethnic educational preference gap (σ) is large relative to the difference in quality
between the two schools, the inequality in (9) is reversed and all B1 pupils travel to School 2, while all
A2 pupils travel to School 1. The resulting equilibrium is called the Segregation Outcome.
3.3 Equilibria
Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is the appropriate equilibrium concept for this dynamic game of
complete information.  I restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria that fulfill the following
14
monotonicity condition: if a household tn ∈ {A1, A2, B1, B2} and travel cost ω* does not travel to the
distant school, then tn households with ω > ω* do not travel to the distant school.
Definition 2:ωtn∈ [0,1] is the proportion of tn ∈ {A1, A2, B1, B2} pupils who attend the distant school.
Given common knowledge parameters (δ1,0, δ2,0, ε1, ε2, ∆, σ, α), a Nash equilibrium is
characterized by a set of cut-off travel costs (ωA2*, ωB1*, ωB2*) that satisfy incentive compatibility
constraints for all household types (t,ω)∈ {A1, A2, B1, B2} x [0,1]. Assumption 4 implies that ωA1 = 0
(no A1 pupils travel to School 2). Three claims characterize the solution; all proofs are in Appendix B.
Claim 1: a) ωB1* > 0  ⇒ ωB2* = 0
b) ωB1* = 0 ⇒ ωB2* ≥ 0
c) ωB2* > 0  ⇒ ωB1* = 0
d) ωB2* = 0 ⇒ ωB1* ≥ 0
Claim 2: a) ωB2* < 1  ⇒  ωA2* > ωB2*
b) ωB2* = 1  ⇒  ωA2* = 1
Claim 3: ωA2* > 0
Claim 1 implies that either B pupils travel from School 1 to School 2, or from School 2 to
School 1, but never both.  The intuition is if some B2 pupils are willing to pay a travel cost to attend
School 1, then all B1 pupils – who can attend School 1 without paying the travel cost – also prefer
School 1.  Claim 2 implies that at a given travel cost A2 pupils are more likely to travel to School 1
than B2 pupils, since A2 pupils prefer the educational instruction type at School 1 (s1= sA) to the
instruction type at School 2 (s2 = sB).  Claim 3 implies that A2 pupils with low travel costs attend
School 1. There are two generic pure strategy equilibria:12
The Magnet Outcome:
ωA2* > ωB2* > 0
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ωB1* = ωA1* = 0
Proposition 1: In the Magnet Outcome
a) School 1 is more ethnically diverse than School 2: γ1 > γ2
b) School 1 is better funded than School 2: g1 > g2
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
Proposition 1 indicates that school funding and ethnic diversity are positively correlated across the
two schools in a Magnet Outcome, even if ethnic diversity has a negative effect on educational
efficiency (f′ < 0), as some Area 2 pupils from both ethnic groups attend School 1 for its superior
educational quality.  School 2 becomes a poorly funded, low quality and relatively ethnically
homogeneous “ghetto”.
The Segregation Outcome:
ωA2* > 0,   ωB1* > 0
ωA1* = ωB2* = 0
Some B1 pupils travel to School 2 despite both better quality education in School 1 and the travel
cost.   Perfect sorting is a special case of the Segregation Outcome (Proposition 2) when mobility is
costless, school quality is the same in both schools, and ethnic diversity is not beneficial for the
efficiency of educational production, a finding reminiscent of Tiebout’s [1956] seminal result.
Proposition 2: If mobility is costless (∆ = 0), quality is the same in both schools (ε1 = ε2), educational
instruction preferences differ across ethnic groups (σ > 0), and diversity is not beneficial for
educational production  (f′ (γ) ≤ 0 ∀ γ), then there is complete ethnic sorting (δ1 = 1, δ2 = 0).
Proof: Refer to Appendix B.
The following example briefly illustrates the workings of the model when f(γ) ≠ 1.  For simplicity I
consider ε2 = ε < 1 = ε1, and f(γ) = 1 for γ  < γ* and f(γ) = ρ ≠ 1 for γ ≥ γ*, a functional form that
accommodates both cases where increased ethnic diversity either reduces educational efficiency (ρ <
1) or improves efficiency (ρ > 1). I restrict attention to equilibria in which γ1 ≥ γ* and γ2 < γ*.   The
Magnet Outcome occurs when ωB2* > 0, or when:
 (1 – α)⋅(1 – (ε /ρ)1/(1-α)) > σ (10)
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The Magnet Outcome does not occur if ρ is sufficiently small, as integration is costly when ethnic
diversity is associated with inefficient educational production, but does occur if the gap in educational
quality between the two schools is sufficiently large (ε small).  The Segregation Outcome occurs when
the inequality in (10) is reversed.  Multiple equilibria may be possible if integration is associated with
more efficient educational production (ρ > 1), as proved in Claim A1 in Appendix B.
3.4 Empirical implications
The following implications of the theory are tested in western Kenya primary schools. γm is ethno-
linguistic fractionalization in School m, and γm,0 is ethno-linguistic fractionalization among households
residing in Area m. τ denotes the true effect of ethnic diversity on school funding, and τols denotes the
ordinary least squares regression estimate of the effect of ethnic diversity on school funding.
(i) Corr(γm - γm,0, gm) > 0
Proposition 1 implies that the difference between school and local ethnic diversity is positively
correlated with the level of school funding in a Magnet Outcome, as good schools with high levels of
school funding attract ethnically diverse pupil populations from surrounding areas.  This positive local
relationship between ethnic diversity and school funding among neighboring schools is not
inconsistent with a negative relationship among schools not within walking distance of each other, if
ethnic diversity is associated with less efficient educational production (f’(γ) < 0).  Table 4 indicates
that flows of ethnic minority transfer students are large in western Kenya primary school, suggesting
that the Magnet Outcome may be the relevant case there.
(ii) τols > τ
Endogenous pupil mobility in the Magnet Outcome implies that high quality and well-funded schools
attract ethnically diverse student populations (Proposition 1).  As a result, ordinary least squares
regressions of school funding (dependent variable) on ethnic diversity (explanatory variable) that fail
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to control for unobserved aspects of school quality suffer from an upward omitted variable bias in the
estimated coefficient on ethnic diversity, since both ethnic diversity and school funding are positively
related to school quality.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Identification strategy
The principal empirical insight provided by the model is that school quality may be positively
correlated with school-level ethnic diversity due to endogenous pupil mobility (Proposition 1),
introducing an omitted variable bias if school quality is imperfectly observed.  The ethnic diversity of
pupils in the surrounding geographic zone – a measure of diversity largely independent of pupil
mobility among neighboring schools – is used as an instrumental variable for school-level diversity to
address this potential bias. The ethnic composition of particular zones in western Kenya is stable –
being tied to traditional tribal and subtribal lands – and is plausibly exogenous (Government of Great
Britain [1929], p. 5; Leo [1984]).  Zonal ethnic diversity is computed among all pupils from sample
schools in the corresponding zone.
In Kenya, the hierarchy of geographic areas in terms of size is province (largest area), district,
division, and zone (smallest area). Since indicator variables for the geographic divisions are included
in most empirical specifications to control for regional differences in income and tastes for education,
the relationship between ethnic diversity and school outcomes is identified across zones within the
same geographic division. In all specifications, I assume that regression disturbance terms are
independent across geographic zones, but may be correlated within zones.
Table 5 presents local funding and ethnic diversity for the 22 geographic zones in the sample.
Local funds per pupil and ethnic diversity are negatively correlated across zones in Angurai,
Budalangi, Butula, Matayos, and Nambale divisions, while there is no clear pattern in Funyula and
Amukura divisions.  (Amagoro division, which only contains a single sample school, is grouped with
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neighboring Angurai division in the empirical analysis.)  Donations from local harambee fundraisers
appear to account for the negative relationship between total funds and ethnic diversity in Table 5.
Socioeconomic status and ethnicity
Although Table 2 suggests that there are no significant socioeconomic differences across ethnic groups
in rural areas of Busia and Teso districts, it remains possible that ethnic diversity measures are
proxying for the size of particular ethnic groups, whose members differ from other ethnic groups in
either income (which is unobserved) or their average taste for education. To control for such
demographic and socioeconomic variation across zones, average fathers’ education, iron roof
ownership, and the proportion of each ethnic group (Khayo, Luo, Marachi, Nyala, Samia, and Teso) in
the surrounding geographic zone are included as explanatory variables in many specifications.
Ethnic diversity may affect local school funding indirectly, through its impact on other
economic outcomes.  Ethnically diverse regions may be poor because contracts are harder to enforce
within heterogeneous communities, leading credit, land and labor markets to function less efficiently in
such areas (Besley and Coate [1995]; Grief [1993]; LaFerrara [1997]). There may be less incentive to
invest in education in areas with poor credit and land markets.  Reduced form specifications that
exclude socioeconomic controls as explanatory variables capture the total relationship between ethnic
diversity and primary school outcomes, including this possible indirect effect through other economic
outcomes.  When socioeconomic controls are included as explanatory variables, the coefficient
estimate on ethnic diversity can be interpreted as the direct effect of ethnic diversity on primary school
outcomes.
Pupil mobility across zones
Although pupils may walk across zonal boundaries to attend school, most mobility is likely to occur
within zones since pupils cannot plausibly walk more than a few kilometers to school. There is
insufficient information on the location of pupil residences to identify which pupils do cross zonal
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boundaries, so the zonal ethnic diversity measures are not entirely independent of endogenous pupil
mobility.13  However, if pupils generally travel to zones with good quality schools – a zonal Magnet
Outcome effect – there will be an upward bias (toward zero) on zonal ethnic diversity coefficient
estimates, strengthening the empirical results.
To address the effect of pupil mobility across zonal boundaries on school ethnic diversity, the
ethnic diversity of each school’s nearest neighboring geographic zone is considered as a possible
instrumental variable for school-level diversity.  Regressions 2,4, and 6 in Table 6 suggest that
neighboring zone ethnic diversity is a weak predictor of school ethnic diversity, and I do not include it
as an instrumental variable in any regressions.  Table 6 includes zonal socioeconomic characteristics
(fathers’ education and iron roof ownership) as additional explanatory variables, and indicates that
zonal socioeconomic measures are insignificantly related to school ethnic diversity.
Although family residential mobility is uncommon in western Kenya due to the thin land sale
market and reluctance to sell family lands, children could potentially move in with relatives to attend a
primary school that is not within walking distance of their home.  Table 2 presents evidence that less
than 15 percent of pupils are not living with a parent, among pupils with at least one surviving parent.
Since some of these pupils moved in with relatives residing in the same geographic zone as their
parents – since relatives often live near each other – the proportion of children who move in with
relatives to attend a primary school in a different geographic zone is plausibly considerably less than
15 percent, although data limitations make it impossible to determine the exact rate.  Such rates of
pupil residential mobility are unlikely to dramatically change measured levels of school-level ethnic
diversity.
                                                          
13
 It would be ideal to use Kenyan census data for an independent measure of local ethnic diversity.  However, the author’s
repeated attempts to obtain Kenyan detailed demographic data at the zonal level have not been successful.
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4.2 Data
Table 1 contains the data description. The principal empirical measures of ethnic diversity are ethno-
linguistic fractionalization disaggregating Luhya subtribes (ETHNIC1) and aggregating Luhya
subtribes (ETHNIC2); ethno-linguistic fractionalization among the Luhya subtribes (ETHNIC3); and
the size of the largest ethnic group in a school, disaggregating Luhya subtribes (LARGEGRP).
Religious diversity is not included as an explanatory variable in the empirical analysis, since
local religious affiliation is not plausibly exogenous due to the extensive missionary activity in this
area during the past century.  A negative correlation between religious fragmentation and school
funding cannot be interpreted as a causal relationship if evangelical activity is targeted to and is most
successful in poor areas, for example.
The principal educational outcome measure is total local funding per pupil in 1995 (FUNDS1)
collected from school fees as well as from local fundraising meetings. FUNDS1 does not include funds
raised from outside sources, such as non-governmental organizations.  Since the non-governmental
organization (ICS) excluded schools that were receiving considerable donor assistance from their
program, only six of the 97 sample schools received over $100 in outside funding in 1995, and there is
no indication that local fundraising was crowded out in these schools (regressions not shown).  Total
local funding is composed of funds collected directly from school fees (FEES1), and funds collected
from donations to the school (DONAT1), principally from local community fundraisers (harambees).
The proportion of parents contributing to the school parent-teacher association fund and the proportion
of parents attending the 1995 School Meeting reflect parent participation in the primary school.
School facilities are additional educational outcome measures, since chronically under-funded
schools are likely to have fewer educational resources than other schools.  The number of desks per
pupil, pupil latrines per pupil, and classrooms per pupil in 1996 are measures of schools’ physical
facilities.  School-owned textbooks per pupil is another measure of past local educational investment.
21
The final educational outcome measure is performance on government primary school examinations
for grades 6 to 8.
School characteristics are included as explanatory variables in certain specifications as controls
for school quality. These include the number of primary schools within a three kilometer radius, the
year of school founding, the pupil population, an indicator variable for a male headmaster, and an
indicator variable if the school headmaster believes the school’s highest priority is the purchase of
textbooks, which may contain information on headmaster quality. Teacher characteristics include the
frequency of assigned homework, the proportion of teachers in the school with a high school-
equivalent Form IV education, and the proportion of male teachers in the school.  It is theoretically
unclear how gender affects teacher quality. Ethno-linguistic diversity among teachers, and an indicator
variable if the headmaster is not a member of the school’s largest ethnic group are additional school
characteristics.
4.3 Results
Tables 7 and 8 present results using ethno-linguistic fractionalization disaggregating Luhya subtribes
(ETHNIC1), and the proportion of the school’s largest ethnic group (LARGEGRP), respectively, as the
measure of ethnic diversity.  The instrumental variable for both measures of school ethnic diversity is
zonal ethnic diversity disaggregating Luhya subtribes (ZETHNIC1).  Coefficient point estimates on
both measures of ethnic diversity are negative, and the instrumental variable estimates are significantly
different than zero at 90 or 95 percent confidence.  The coefficient on ethnic diversity remains negative
and significantly different than zero at 95 percent confidence when the proportion of each ethnic group
in the zone and zonal socioeconomic controls are included, suggesting that the measures of ethnic
diversity are not proxying for ethnic socioeconomic stratification. The first stage F-statistics are
significantly different than zero at high levels of confidence (Table 6). The Magnet Outcome bias
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discussed in Section 3.4 is a potential explanation for both the insignificant negative relationship
between ethnic diversity and school funding, and the poor fit of the ordinary least squares regressions.
An interpretation of the instrumental variable coefficient estimate on ethnic diversity in Table
7, regression 5 is that the drop in local school funding associated with a change from ethnic
homogeneity to median school-level ethnic diversity is roughly 30 percent of average local funding.
Figure 2 plots local school funding versus ethno-linguistic fractionalization for the 97 schools
in the sample, and reveals that no ethnically diverse school (with ETHNIC1 ≥ 0.5) is well funded.  A
non-parametric t-test that the proportion of schools with funding greater than 250 shillings per pupil is
the same for schools with ETHNIC1 > 0.5 and for those with ETHNIC1 ≤ 0.5 is rejected at 99 percent
confidence. The unexplained variation in the data may be due to unobserved components of school
quality, or to weather and commodity price shocks that affect parents’ ability to pay school fees.
Figure 2:
Ethnic diversity versus total school funding per pupil in 1995
Table 9 suggests that ethnic diversity is associated with a variety of local collective action
problems.  Ethnic diversity is strongly negatively associated with the collection of donations from
community fundraisers (harambees), but not significantly related to the level of school fees collected
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per pupil.  Organizing a successful harambee requires considerable community participation, which
may be lacking in ethnically diverse areas.  Table 9 also suggests that parent participation in the
parent-teacher association and in school meetings is significantly lower in ethnically diverse areas than
in homogeneous areas.
Table 10 includes a range of headmaster, school, and teacher characteristics as potential
controls for school quality. The Magnet Outcome presented in Section 3 suggests that the coefficient
point estimate on ETHNIC1 should become more negative when school quality is included as an
explanatory variable, since endogenous pupil mobility implies that quality and funding are positively
correlated across neighboring schools. ETHNIC1 remains significantly different than zero at 95 percent
confidence across all specifications when school and teacher characteristics are included as
explanatory variables, and coefficient point estimates become more negative in several specifications.
However, a change in the school sample due to missing data complicates the interpretation of this
change in the coefficient estimate. The headmaster, school and teacher characteristics are insignificant
predictors of school funding, with the exception of having a male headmaster, which is significantly
negatively associated with the level of school funding.
Table 11 includes both ethnic diversity aggregating Luhya subtribes and ethnic diversity among
the Luhya subtribes as explanatory variables, and suggests that ethnic diversity across tribes
(ETHNIC2) accounts for the observed negative relationship between ethnic diversity and school
funding.  The effect of ethnic diversity among Luhya subtribes (ETHNIC3) on school funding is
insignificantly different from zero in both regressions.
The estimated ordinary least squares coefficients on ethnic diversity are uniformly greater than
the instrumental variable estimates in Tables 7 and 8.  This is consistent with both the theoretical
Magnet Outcome presented in Section 3, and with attenuation bias.  Measurement error in the ethnic
diversity indexes is likely since ethnic affiliation is available for only a subsample of pupils in each
school.  Table 12 attempts to determine which of the two explanations is driving the pattern between
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OLS and IV coefficient estimates.  If the difference between school and zonal ethnic diversity
(DIFETHN) is primarily due to measurement error from pupil absences on the day of questionnaire
administration, data entry errors, or random noise, then DIFETHN and school funding will be
unrelated.  However, if zonal ethnic diversity is a reasonable proxy for local ethnic diversity within
walking distance of a school, the theory predicts that Magnet schools will be both more ethnically
diverse and better funded than surrounding schools (Proposition 1), implying a positive relationship
between DIFETHN and FUNDS1.  In Table 12 the coefficient estimates on DIFETHN1 and
DIFETHN2 are both positive, and the coefficient on DIFETHN2 is nearly significantly different than
zero at 90 percent confidence (t > 1.4). I interpret this as suggestive empirical support for the Magnet
Outcome effect.
Table 13 presents the relationship between ethnic diversity and primary school facilities in
1996.  Current school facilities reflect the cumulative impact of past local educational investment
decisions.  Levels of desks per pupil, pupil latrines per pupil, and classrooms per pupil are all found to
be negatively associated with ethnic diversity.  The coefficient estimates on ethnic diversity are large,
negative and significantly different than zero at 95 percent confidence in both instrumental variable
regressions for desks per pupil and latrines per pupil, and significantly different than zero for one of
the two instrumental variable specifications for classrooms per pupil. Taken together, these results
suggest that primary schools in ethnically diverse areas have significantly worse physical facilities than
schools in more homogeneous areas. An interpretation of the instrumental variable coefficient
estimates on ethnic diversity is that the drop in desks per pupil associated with the change from ethnic
homogeneity to median school-level ethnic diversity is 35-59 percent of average desks per pupil.
Table 13 also includes the stock of school textbooks per pupil as a dependent variable.
Although the coefficient estimates on ethnic diversity are negative in all three specifications, they are
not significantly different than zero at traditional confidence levels. The scope for parental conflict
over particular educational investments may explain the different results for textbook provision and
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infrastructure investments.  The purchase of standard government textbooks is likely to be less
controversial across ethnic groups than the decision of which school structures to build, and
specifically who gets the contract to build them (Gugerty et al. [1999]).
I also report the relationship between ethnic diversity and privately-owned textbooks per pupil,
to explore the possibility of substitution from publicly-provided to privately-owned textbooks in
ethnically diverse areas, and find that coefficient point estimates on ethnic diversity are insignificantly
different than zero in all specifications with private textbooks per pupil as the dependent variable.
Table 14 examines the relationship between ethnic diversity and school average scores on
government examinations for pupils in standards 6 to 8.  The results suggest that there is no clear
relationship between test score performance and ethnic diversity in these schools.  This may be
surprising given the lower levels of local school funding, and worse physical facilities and parental
involvement in ethnically diverse areas.  A possible explanation is provided by Regression 5 in Table
14, which indicates that the stock of school-owned textbooks per pupil is positively associated with test
scores, and the stock of desks and classrooms per pupil are insignificantly related to test performance.
Table 13 suggested that additional local school funds in ethnically homogeneous areas are principally
invested in physical infrastructure projects rather than in textbooks.
Several other explanations may account for the weak relationship between ethnic diversity and
test scores in these primary schools.  First, it is difficult to interpret average school test score results
since some schools exclude their worst students from taking exams (Glewwe, et al [1998]).
Unfortunately, there is insufficient information on which students sat for the government exams to
address this participation bias.  Second, local educational investments may affect school performance
in ways not captured by Kenyan government examinations, which tend to emphasize rote learning
(Somerset [1987]).  Finally, the empirical relationship between school funding and academic outcomes
in less developed countries remains disputed. Hanushek’s [1995] survey concludes that there is little
evidence of a systematic causal relationship between educational inputs and test scores in developing
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countries.  However, Case and Deaton [1998] find that school funding has a strong positive effect on
numeracy test scores and pupil enrollment among South African primary school students.
Table 14 (regression 5) suggests that schools with a high proportion of male teachers perform
poorly on government examinations, and that schools with large pupil populations outperform smaller
schools, once controls are included for school quality.  However, the endogeneity of pupil population
complicates the interpretation of this coefficient estimate.
5 Discussion
The empirical results paint a picture of pervasive local collective action problems in ethnically diverse
primary schools in rural western Kenya.  Ethnic diversity is associated with sharply lower total local
school funding, less parental participation in parent-teacher associations and school meetings, and with
fewer educational investments such as desks, classrooms, and latrines, although not with textbook
provision. Ethnic diversity across tribes (Luhya, Luo and Teso) rather than among Luhya subtribes
appears to be driving the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and school outcomes,
suggesting that collective action problems may be more severe in the presence of larger cultural and
linguistic differences.
Lower donations from local fundraisers (harambees) – events that require considerable
organizational effort and community participation – in ethnically diverse areas account for the drop in
local school funding. This pattern of contributions may arise if community sanctions against free-riders
are more effective in homogeneous communities, or if local politicians and business people –
important harambee contributors – gain more by publicly contributing to schools in which their ethnic
group is dominant.  The negative estimated relationship between ethnic diversity and harambee
contributions suggests that diversity may be negatively associated with the provision of other local
public goods in Kenya, given the central role that harambees play in Kenyan local public finance
(Wilson [1992]).  However, it is unclear if the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and
27
school funding identified in this paper is robust to settings in which voluntary community fundraisers
are not a principal source of funding.
Centralizing funding decisions at the regional or national level is a possible response to the
negative impact of local ethnic diversity on school funding.  This has occurred to a large extent in
Kenya as teacher salaries – primary schools’ largest expense – are paid by the national Ministry of
Education.  However, centralized provision introduces the problem of ethnic and regional conflict at
the national level.  Barkan and Chege [1989] study the allocation of national road construction funds in
Kenya during the 1970s and 1980s, and find that the proportion of road funds allocated to the ethnic
homeland of former Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta fell from 44 percent in 1979-1980 to 16 percent
in 1987-1988 after Kenyatta’s Kikuyu ethnic group lost its dominant position in the central
government, while the ethnic homeland of Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi – who replaced
Kenyatta – saw its share of road funds rise from 32 to 57 percent during the same period.  If the central
government allocated funds for desks, chalk, and textbooks similarly, politically marginalized areas
might be largely excluded from school funds.  Besley and Coate [1999] argue formally that the
decentralized provision of local public goods may be optimal in countries with such ‘winner-takes-all’
national politics, even in settings where there are efficiency benefits to centralized provision.
A robust negative relationship between local ethnic diversity and human capital accumulation
would have bleak welfare implications for many countries, including most of sub-Saharan Africa.
Before drawing broad conclusions about the impact of ethnic diversity on economic growth, however,
further research should examine the relationship between ethnic diversity, school finance, and human
capital accumulation in a variety of other countries and settings.
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Appendix A:
Table 1: Data Description
Variable name Definition and source
Ethnic diversity
ETHNIC1 Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization index which counts Luhya subtribes as
separate groups. (SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil Questionnaire)
ETHNIC2 Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization index which counts Luhya subtribes as
one group. (SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil Questionnaire)
ETHNIC3 ETHNIC1 – ETHNIC2. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization among Luhyas.
(SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil Questionnaire)
LARGEGRP Proportion of student population accounted for by the largest group,
disaggregating Luhya subtribes.  (SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil Questionnaire)
ZETHNIC1 Zonal pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization index in the surrounding
geographic zone, which counts Luhya subtribes as separate groups, computed
among pupils who filled the Pupil Questionnaire in early 1996.  (SOURCE:
1996 ICS Pupil Questionnaire)
ZETHNIC2 Zonal pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization index in the surrounding
geographic zone, which counts Luhyas as one group, computed among pupils
who filled the Pupil Questionnaire in early 1996.  (SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil
Questionnaire)
ZETHNIC3 ZETHNIC1 – ZETHNIC2.  Zonal ethno-linguistic fractionalization among
Luhyas in the surrounding geographic zone. (SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil
Questionnaire)
NETHNIC1 Zonal pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization index in the nearest neighboring
geographic zone to the school, counting Luhya subtribes as separate groups.
(SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil Questionnaire)
NETHNIC2 Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization index in the nearest neighboring
geographic zone to the school, counting Luhyas as a single group. (SOURCE:
1996 ICS Pupil Questionnaire)
NETHNIC3 Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization index in the nearest neighboring
geographic zone to the school, among Luhyas. (SOURCE: 1996 ICS Pupil
Questionnaire)
DIFETHN1 ETHNIC1 – ZETHNIC1
DIFETHN2 ETHNIC2 – ZETHNIC2
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Educational outcomes
FUNDS1 Total school funding per pupil raised from school fees and donations, minus
“activity funds” which are sent to the District Education Officer, 1995.
(SOURCE: 1996 ICS School Questionnaire)
FEES1 School funding per pupil raised from school fees, minus “activity funds” which
are sent to the District Education Officer, 1995.  (SOURCE: 1996 ICS School
Questionnaire)
DONAT1 School funding per pupil raised from donations, principally harambees, 1995.
(SOURCE: 1996 ICS School Questionnaire)
PTA2PUP Parents who participated in funding the parent-teacher association per pupil,
1995 (SOURCE: 1996 ICS School Questionnaire)
MEET2PUP Parents who attended the school meeting per pupil, 1995 (SOURCE: 1996 ICS
School Questionnaire)
DESK2PUP Desks per pupil in the school, 1996 (SOURCE: 1996 ICS School
Questionnaire)
PLAT2PUP Pupil latrines per pupil in the school, 1996 (SOURCE: 1996 ICS School
Questionnaire)
ROOM2PUP Classrooms per pupil in the school, 1996 (SOURCE: 1996 ICS School
Questionnaire)
BKS2PUP School textbooks per pupil in the school in 1996 (SOURCE: 1996 ICS School
Questionnaire)
TEXT2PUP Personal textbooks per pupil in 1996. (SOURCE: 1996 ICS School
Questionnaire)
TEST95 Average school score in standards 6 through 8 on the 1995 KCPE, national
government primary school examination (SOURCE: District-All Data, ICS
office in Busia)
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Table 2:
Average pupil characteristics, by ethnic group*
Entire
pupil
sample
Luo
pupils
Teso
pupils
Luhya
pupils
Khayo
(Luhya)
pupils
Marachi
(Luhya)
pupils
Nyala
(Luhya)
pupils
Samia
(Luhya)
pupils
Number of pupils
interviewed
6626 328 1686 4414 1194 1154 535 1417
Proportion of pupil sample 1.000 0.050 0.256 0.670 0.181 0.175 0.081 0.215
Age in years 14.5 14.5 14.7 14.5 14.6 14.4 14.7 14.4
Latrine ownership 0.848 0.798 0.880 0.838 0.877 0.888 0.626 0.841
Iron roof ownership 0.256 0.309 0.226 0.258 0.230 0.256 0.267 0.275
Fathers with post-primary
education
0.380 0.332 0.381 0.378 0.354 0.306 0.412 0.448
Mothers with post-primary
education
0.187 0.214 0.185 0.183 0.177 0.150 0.175 0.214
Attends primary school that
is not closest to home
0.180 0.167 0.179 0.180 0.141 0.199 0.195 0.192
Lives with a parent, given
that at least one parent is
alive
0.851 0.831 0.878 0.844 0.846 0.862 0.835 0.832
                                                          
*
 Other Luhya subtribes comprise 0.018 of the pupil sample, and other non-Luhya ethnic groups comprise 0.020 of the
sample. Other Luhya subtribes in Busia and Teso districts include the Bukusu, Dakho, Kabras, Marama, and Sukha. Other
non-Luhya ethnic groups in this area include the Kikuyu, Masaai, Saboat, Somali, Tachoni, and Taita.
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 Table 3:
The proportion of pupils attending a school not closest to home (1996)
(Source: 1996 ICS School Questionnaire and Pupil Questionnaire)
Number of schools within a three
kilometer radius of the school
% of pupils attending a school not
closest to home
Zero (19 Schools) 17.4
One (23 Schools) 19.1
Two (15 Schools) 15.2
Three (18 Schools) 20.4
Four (22 Schools) 16.0
Table 4:
The proportion of transfer students not from the school’s largest ethnic group (1996)
(Source: 1996 ICS School Questionnaire and Pupil Questionnaire)
Largest ethnic group in the school Average % of transfer
students from other ethnic
groups
Luhya – all subtribes (60 schools) 11.1
    Khayo (18 schools) 45.6
    Marachi (15 schools) 17.1
    Nyala (7 schools) 28.7
    Samia (20 schools) 20.0
Luo (3 schools) 41.7
Teso (31 schools) 21.6
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Table 5: 1995 average district, division, and zone characteristics*
(schools with complete demographic and financial information)
Geographic area Number
of
schools
Number
of
pupils
Total local
funds per
pupil
Local
donations
per pupil
Ethnic1 Ethnic2 Ethnic3
Entire sample 92 26936 135.5 44.5 0.328 0.204 0.124
Busia district 63 19826 151.6 56.9 0.353 0.189 0.164
  Budalangi division 7 2160 243.9 188.3 0.287 0.122 0.165
    Bunyala North zone 4 1509 208.3 147.2 0.352 0.144 0.208
    Bunyala South zone 3 651 291.2 243.2 0.115 0.058 0.056
  Butula division 17 5676 162.6 58.5 0.351 0.161 0.190
    Burinda zone 4 1198 124.3 12.1 0.717 0.327 0.390
    Butunyi zone 3 906 114.0 16.6 0.404 0.169 0.235
    Marachi North zone 4 1728 160.9 58.9 0.311 0.092 0.219
    Tingolo zone 6 1844 213.7 110.0 0.328 0.262 0.066
  Funyula division 20 5687 136.1 48.8 0.220 0.097 0.124
    Agenga/Nanguba zone 5 1839 151.5 48.1 0.167 0.037 0.131
    Bwiri zone 4 1234 187.3 107.1 0.370 0.143 0.226
    Funyula zone 5 1377 111.8 20.5 0.251 0.217 0.035
    Nambuku zone 6 1237 109.2 34.1 0.169 0.041 0.128
  Matayos division 8 2959 125.7 30.6 0.355 0.233 0.121
    Bukhayo South zone 3 1185 142.2 66.3 0.210 0.081 0.129
    Mundika zone 5 1774 115.8 9.1 0.574 0.452 0.122
  Nambale division 11 3344 122.9 4.6 0.623 0.398 0.224
    Bukhayo Central zone 6 1792 138.7 7.6 0.645 0.328 0.317
    Bukhayo East zone 2 574 99.2 0 0.738 0.326 0.412
    Bukhayo North zone 3 978 107.0 2.8 0.679 0.602 0.076
Teso district 29 7110 100.6 17.6 0.256 0.248 0.009
  Amagoro division 2 567 61.1 0 0.271 0.267 0.004
    Kocholia zone 2 567 61.1 0 0.271 0.267 0.004
  Amukura division 12 2831 124.1 23.5 0.207 0.197 0.010
    Aremit zone 4 711 127.3 24.6 0.070 0.069 0.001
    Kaujakito zone 4 1088 145.5 18.3 0.242 0.234 0.008
    Kotur zone 4 1032 99.5 27.6 0.334 0.315 0.019
  Angurai division 15 3712 87.1 15.3 0.284 0.275 0.008
    Angurai zone 5 1012 122.9 47.5 0.228 0.226 0.002
    Chamasiri zone 7 1758 78.2 0 0.371 0.359 0.012
    Katakwa zone 3 942 48.0 20.1 0.297 0.294 0.003
                                                          
*
 Three schools were the only schools in their zone.  These schools were assigned to the nearest zone: Apegei (schid 105) to
Aremit zone; Mukhobola (schid 158) to Bunyala South zone; Sifuyo (schid 193) to Nambuku zone.  The ethnic diversity
figures are for all schools in the sample, not only those with complete financial and demographic information.
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Table 6: The instrumental variables, ZETHNIC1, ZETHNIC2, ZETHNIC3 *
Dependent variable:
ETHNIC1
Dependent variable:
ETHNIC2
Dependent variable:
ETHNIC3
Explanatory variable
(1)
ols
(2)
ols
(3)
ols
(4)
ols
(5)
ols
(6)
ols
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization
in surrounding geographic zone,
Luhyas disaggregated (ZETHNIC1)
0.869***
(0.065)
0.826***
(0.092)
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization
in nearest neighboring geographic
zone, Luhyas disaggregated
(NETHNIC1)
0.102
(0.089)
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization
in surrounding geographic zone,
Luhyas aggregated (ZETHNIC2)
0.849***
(0.087)
0.833***
(0.105)
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization
in nearest neighboring geographic
zone, Luhyas aggregated (NETHNIC2)
0.125
(0.113)
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization
in surrounding geographic zone among
Luhyas (ZETHNIC3)
0.815***
(0.121)
0.740***
(0.098)
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization
in nearest neighboring geographic zone
among Luhyas (NETHNIC3)
0.089
(0.087)
Proportion of fathers in the geographic
zone with some post-primary
education (ZFEDUC)
-0.013
(0.201)
-0.087
(0.189)
0.006
(0.138)
Proportion of pupils in the geographic
zone with iron roofing (ZIRONROO)
0.089
(0.277)
0.022
(0.245)
0.178
(0.193)
R2 0.56 0.56 0.43 0.44 0.55 0.56
Root MSE 0.142 0.144 0.136 0.137 0.090 0.090
Number of observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
Mean of dependent variable 0.314 0.202 0.112
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**),
99% (***) confidence.
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Table 7: Dependent variable, Total local school funds raised in 1995 (FUNDS1)*
Explanatory variable
(1)
ols
(2)
ols
(3)
iv-2sls
(4)
iv-2sls
(5)
iv-2sls
Pupil ethno-linguistic
fractionalization disaggregating
Luhya subtribes (ETHNIC1)
-10.0
(39.3)
-10.3
(49.1)
-142.7*
(69.2)
-110.6**
(49.5)
-155.4**
(62.9)
Proportion of Khayo pupils in the
geographic zone (ZKHAYO)
-4.1
(54.0)
41.4
(64.0)
Proportion of Luo pupils in the
geographic zone (ZLUO)
89.8
(172.5)
182.6
(210.4)
Proportion of Nyala pupils in the
geographic zone (ZNYALA)
233.7*
(131.2)
238.3
(144.7)
Proportion of Samia pupils in the
geographic zone (ZSAMIA)
-412.5**
(163.0)
-458.8***
(158.5)
Proportion of Teso pupils in the
geographic zone (ZTESO)
-38.9
(55.2)
-4.3
(78.1)
Proportion of fathers in the school
with some post-primary education
(FEDUC)
113.3
(93.2)
Proportion of fathers in the
geographic zone with some post-
primary education (ZFEDUC)
30.6
(126.0)
Proportion of pupils in the
geographic zone with iron roofing
(ZIRONROO)
-90.7
(105.8)
Geographical division indicators No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.00 0.19 - - -
Root MSE 92.6 86.4 89.2 88.6 91.1
Number of schools 92 92 92 92 92
Mean of dependent variable 135.5
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**),
99% (***) confidence.  The instrumental variable for ETHNIC1 is zonal ethno-linguistic fractionalization
disaggregating Luhyas (ZETHNIC1). Observations are assumed to have independent error terms across
geographic zones, but not necessarily within zones.
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Table 8: Dependent variable, Total local school funds raised in 1995 (FUNDS1)*
Explanatory variable
(1)
ols
 (2)
ols
 (3)
iv-2sls
 (4)
iv-2sls
 (5)
iv-2sls
Proportion of pupils in the school’s
largest ethnic group, Luhyas
disaggregated  (LARGEGRP)
23.8
(42.9)
28.3
(53.8)
185.4**
(86.7)
156.9**
(67.3)
214.1**
(82.4)
Proportion of Khayo pupils in the
geographic zone (ZKHAYO)
-12.7
(53.9)
23.1
(64.0)
Proportion of Luo pupils in the
geographic zone (ZLUO)
109.1
(169.2)
203.6
(203.4)
Proportion of Nyala pupils in the
geographic zone (ZNYALA)
277.0**
(123.1)
296.6**
(131.3)
Proportion of Samia pupils in the
geographic zone (ZSAMIA)
-357.2**
(160.4)
-376.5**
(157.4)
Proportion of Teso pupils in the
geographic zone (ZTESO)
-43.5
(53.9)
-17.9
(74.8)
Proportion of fathers in the school
with some post-primary education
(FEDUC)
104.2
(96.3)
Proportion of fathers in the
geographic zone with some post-
primary education (ZFEDUC)
26.6
(128.6)
Proportion of pupils in the
geographic zone with iron roofing
(ZIRONROO)
-90.7
(101.9)
Geographical division indicators No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.00 0.19 - - -
Root MSE 92.5 86.4 89.0 88.8 91.6
Number of schools 92 92 92 92 92
Mean of dependent variable 135.5
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**),
99% (***) confidence.  The instrumental variable for ETHNIC1 is zonal ethno-linguistic fractionalization
disaggregating Luhyas (ZETHNIC1). Observations are assumed to have independent error terms across
geographic zones, but not necessarily within zones.
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Table 9:
Sources of funding, and parent participation in school activities*
Coefficient estimate on
ETHNIC1
Dependent variable
(1)
ols
(2)
iv-2sls
(3)
iv-2sls
Number
of
schools
Mean of
dependent
variable
Sources of local funding
Total school fees collected per pupil, 1995
(FEES1)
2.1
(29.2)
16.9
(30.1)
-5.1
(38.3)
92 91.0
Total donations collected per pupil, 1995
(DONAT1)
-12.4
(58.7)
-159.5*
(77.2)
-150.4**
(60.0)
92 44.5
Parent participation in the school
Parents who participated in funding the parent-
teacher association per pupil, 1995 (PTA2PUP)
-0.039
(0.073)
-0.173**
(0.074)
-0.356***
(0.092)
92 0.217
Parents who attended the school meeting per pupil,
1995 (MEET2PUP)
-0.125***
(0.026)
-0.150***
(0.048)
-0.110
(0.094)
95 0.195
Geographical division indicators Yes Yes Yes
Demographic and socioeconomic controls No No Yes
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99%
(***) confidence.  The instrumental variable for ETHNIC1 is zonal ethno-linguistic fractionalization
disaggregating Luhyas (ZETHNIC1).  Observations are assumed to have independent error terms across
geographic zones, but not necessarily within zones.  The demographic and socioeconomic controls include
FEDUC, ZFEDUC, ZIRONROO, ZKHAYO, ZLUO, ZNYALA, ZSAMIA, ZTESO.
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Table 10: Controlling for headmaster, school, and teacher quality
Dependent variable, Total local school funds raised in 1995 (FUNDS1)*
Explanatory variable
(1)
iv-2sls
(2)
iv-2sls
(3)
iv-2sls
(4)
iv-2sls
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization disaggregating Luhya
subtribes (ETHNIC1)
-401.7**
(155.0)
-150.9**
(61.4)
-138.8**
(75.5)
-350.7**
(135.2)
Headmaster is male (HMSEX) -225.8*
(114.7)
-249.5**
(104.7)
Headmaster does not belong to  school’s largest pupil ethnic
group (HMDIFFER)
46.4
(57.8)
13.9
(78.2)
School headmaster thinks that textbook purchase is school’s
highest priority (TEXTBEST)
-7.8
(22.2)
3.3
(21.6)
Number of other primary schools within 3 kilometers of the
school (DIST_3)
6.1
(7.4)
1.4
(12.7)
Total pupil population in the school (TOTSTUD) -0.058
(0.123)
-0.035
(0.109)
Year of school founding (YEARBEGI) -0.16
(1.67)
-1.35
(1.42)
Frequency of assigned homework, reported by teachers
(FREQWORK)
22.8
(14.3)
15.7
(24.5)
Teacher ethno-linguistic fractionalization aggregating Luhya
subtribes (TETHNIC)
130.4**
(61.7)
168.5
(125.6)
Proportion of teachers in the school with high-school
equivalent education, Form IV (TCHIV)
-12.8
(60.5)
79.9
(99.4)
Proportion of male teachers in the school (TCHSEX) 34.4
(64.4)
59.2
(106.3)
Geographical division indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic and socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 - - - -
Root MSE 99.1 93.0 90.1 98.8
Number of schools 74 90 91 72
Mean of dependent variable 135.5
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99%
(***) confidence.  The instrumental variable for ETHNIC1 is ZETHNIC1. Observations are assumed to be
independent across geographic zones, but not necessarily within zones.  The demographic and socioeconomic
controls include FEDUC, ZFEDUC, ZIRONROO, ZKHAYO, ZLUO, ZNYALA, ZSAMIA, ZTESO. The reduced
sample size is due to omitted responses to TEXTBEST.
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Table 11: Alternate measures of ethnic diversity
Dependent variable, Local school funds raised in 1995 (FUNDS1)*
Explanatory variable
(1)
iv-2sls
(2)
iv-2sls
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization across
tribes (ETHNIC2)
-135.3*
(63.2)
-287.0***
(85.5)
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization among
Luhya subtribes (ETHNIC3)
-159.1
(128.6)
34.2
(90.7)
Geographical division indicators Yes Yes
Demographic and socioeconomic controls No Yes
R2 - -
Root MSE 89.4 102.3
Number of schools 92 92
Mean of dependent variable 135.5
Table 12: Testing the Magnet Outcome
Dependent variable, Total local school funds raised in 1995 (FUNDS1)
Explanatory variable
(1)
ols
(2)
ols
Difference between school and zonal
pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization,
disaggregating Luhya subtribes
(DIFETHN1)
58.2
(56.1)
Difference between school and zonal
pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization,
aggregating Luhya subtribes
(DIFETHN2)
90.3
(63.6)
Geographical division indicators Yes Yes
R2 0.19 0.20
Root MSE 86.1 85.5
Number of schools 92 92
Mean of dependent variable 135.5
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99%
(***) confidence.  The instrumental variable for ETHNIC2 is ZETHNIC2, and for ETHNIC3 is ZETHNIC3.
Observations are assumed to have independent error terms across geographic zones, but not necessarily within
zones.  The demographic and socioeconomic controls include FEDUC, ZFEDUC, ZIRONROO, ZKHAYO,
ZLUO, ZNYALA, ZSAMIA, ZTESO.
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Table 13: Primary school facilities and textbooks*
Coefficient estimate on
ETHNIC1
Dependent variable
(1)
ols
(2)
iv-2sls
(3)
iv-2sls
Number
of
schools
Mean of
dependent
variable
Physical infrastructure
Desks per pupil in 1996, reported by headmasters
(DESK2PUP)
-0.15***
(0.05)
-0.27**
(0.10)
-0.45***
(0.13)
96 0.204
Pupil latrines per pupil in 1996, reported by
headmasters (PLAT2PUP)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.017**
(0.008)
-0.036**
(0.015)
96 0.016
Classrooms per pupil in 1996, reported by
headmasters (ROOM2PUP)
-0.014*
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.018)
-0.046***
(0.014)
96 0.031
Textbooks
School-owned textbooks per pupil in 1996,
reported by headmasters (BKS2PUP)
-0.12
(0.12)
-0.10
(0.17)
-0.19
(0.19)
96 0.346
Privately-owned textbooks per pupil 1996, reported
by headmasters (TEXT2PUP)
0.003
(0.056)
-0.002
(0.078)
0.060
(0.076)
96 0.078
Geographical division indicators Yes Yes Yes
Demographic and socioeconomic controls No No Yes
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99%
(***) confidence.  The instrumental variable for ETHNIC1 is zonal ethno-linguistic fractionalization
disaggregating Luhyas (ZETHNIC1).  Observations are assumed to have independent error terms across
geographic zones, but not necessarily within zones.  The demographic and socioeconomic controls include
FEDUC, ZFEDUC, ZIRONROO, ZKHAYO, ZLUO, ZNYALA, ZSAMIA, ZTESO.
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Table 14: School test scores*
Dependent variable, Average school score on 1995 government examinations, standards 6-8 (TEST95)
Explanatory variable
 (1)
ols
 (2)
iv-2sls
 (3)
iv-2sls
 (4)
iv-2sls
(5)
iv-2sls
Pupil ethno-linguistic fractionalization
disaggregating Luhya subtribes
(ETHNIC1)
22.2
(46.5)
52.8
(84.1)
108.4
(78.4)
13.1
(94.9)
-14.8
(74.9)
School-owned textbooks per pupil in
1996 (BKS2PUP)
82.8
(49.2)
146.0***
(51.2)
Privately-owned textbooks per pupil in
1996 (TEXT2PUP)
181.3
(125.7)
112.0
(94.6)
Desks per pupil in 1996
(DESK2PUP)
16.4
(104.0)
8.4
(110.8)
Classrooms per pupil in 1996
(ROOM2PUP)
-1828.7*
(886.3)
-1006.5
(1373.6)
Headmaster is male (HMSEX) -38.3
(33.6)
Headmaster does not belong to  school’s
largest pupil ethnic group (HMDIFFER)
21.7
(25.2)
Teacher ethno-linguistic fractionalization
aggregating Luhya subtribes (TETHNIC)
17.9
(74.2)
Proportion of male teachers in the school
(TCHSEX)
-127.2**
(46.2)
Total pupil population in the school
(TOTSTUD)
0.211**
(0.087)
Geographical division indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic and socioeconomic controls No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.14 - - - -
Root MSE 81.9 82.1 82.1 76.4 69.1
Number of schools 94 94 94 93 88
Mean of dependent variable 822.8
                                                          
*
 Notes: Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99%
(***) confidence.  The instrumental variable for ETHNIC1 is zonal ethno-linguistic fractionalization
disaggregating Luhyas (ZETHNIC1).  Observations are assumed to have independent error terms across
geographic zones, but not necessarily within zones.  The demographic and socioeconomic controls include
FEDUC, ZFEDUC, ZIRONROO, ZKHAYO, ZLUO, ZNYALA, ZSAMIA, ZTESO.
43
Appendix B:
Mathematical Appendix
• Ethnic diversity
For School 1, ethnic diversity after transfers is:
δ1 = [δ1,0 + ωA2δ2,0]/[δ1,0 + ωA2δ2,0 + (1 - ωB1)(1 - δ1,0) + ωB2(1 - δ2,0)] (A-1)
When there are two ethnic groups, γj = 2⋅δj⋅(1 - δj) for j∈ {1,2}:
γ1 = 2[δ1,0 + ωA2δ2,0][(1 - ωB1)(1 - δ1,0) + ωB2(1 - δ2,0)]/[δ1,0 + ωA2δ2,0 + (1 - ωB1)(1 - δ1,0) + ωB2(1 - δ2,0)]2 (A-2)
δ2 and γ2 are defined analogously.
• Utility outcomes
(A-3) UωB1(1) =  g1⋅(1 - σ - α)/α + y
(A-4) UωB1(2) =  g2⋅(1 - α)/α - ∆⋅ω + y
(A-5) UωA2(2) =  g2⋅(1 - σ - α)/α + y
(A-6) UωA2(1) =  g1⋅(1- α)/α - ∆⋅ω + y
(A-7) UωA1(1)  =  g1⋅(1 - α)/α + y
(A-8) UωA1(2)  =  g2⋅(1 - σ - α)/α - ∆⋅ω + y
• Proofs
Claim 1: a) ωB1* > 0  ⇒ ωB2* = 0
b) ωB1* = 0 ⇒ ωB2* ≥ 0
c) ωB2* > 0  ⇒ ωB1* = 0
d) ωB2* = 0 ⇒ ωB1* ≥ 0
Proof:
a) (*) ωB1* > 0 ⇒ UωB1(2) > UB1(1), ∀ ω < ωB1*
(**) UB2(2) = Uω=0B1 (2)
(***) UB1(1) ≥ UωB2(1), ∀ ω
(*), (**), (***) ⇒ UB2(2) = Uω=0B1(2) > UB1(1) ≥ Uω′B2(1), ∀ ω′
⇒ ωB2* = 0
b) (*) ωB2* = 0 ⇒ UB2(2) > UωB2(1) ∀ ω > 0
UB2(2) ≥ Uω=0B2(1)
(**) Uω=0B2(1) = UB1 (1)
(***) Uω=0B1(2) = UB2(2)
(*), (**), (***) ⇒ Uω=0B1(2) = UB2(2) ≥ Uω=0B2(1) = UB1(1)
⇒ ωB1* ≥ 0
c) and d) proven analogously.
Claim 2: a) ωB2* < 1  ⇒  ωA2* > ωB2*
b) ωB2* = 1  ⇒  ωA2* = 1
Proof:
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a) (*) σ ∈ (0, 1-α) ⇒ UωA2(1) > UωB2(1) ∀ ω
UB2(2) > UA2(2)
(**) ωB2* < 1 ⇒ UωB2(1) > UB2 (2) ∀ ω < ωB2*
Uω=ωB2*B2(1) = UB2 (2)
(***) Uω=ωA2*A2(1) = UA2(2)
(*), (**), (***) ⇒ Uω=ωB2*A2(1) > Uω=ωB2* B2(1) = UB2(2) > UA2(2) = Uω=ωA2*A2(1)
⇒ Uω=ωB2*A2(1) > Uω=ωA2*A2(1)
⇒ g1(1/α - 1) - ∆⋅ωB2* > g1(1/α - 1) - ∆⋅ωA2*
⇒ ωA2* > ωB2*
b) Proved analogously, with ωA2* bounded from above at one.
Claim 3: ωA2* > 0
Proof:
Assert that ωA2* = 0 and work toward a contradiction.
(*) ωA2* = 0 ⇒ UA2(2) ≥ Uω=0A2(1)
(**) Uω=0A2(1) = UA1(1)
(***) Uω=0A1(2) = UA2(2)
(*), (**), (***) ⇒ Uω=0A1(2) ≥ UA1(1), contradicting Assumption 4.
Proposition 1: In the Magnet Outcome
a) School 1 is more ethnically diverse than School 2: γ1 > γ2
b) School 1 is better funded than School 2: g1 > g2
Proof:
a) Define ωB2
 
≡ ω ∈ (0,1), and ωA2 = ω + µ > ωB2 by Claim 2. After pupils travel,
(A-9)
When µ = 0, this becomes:
γ1/γ2 = [(1-ω)2 + ω/(δ1,0 - δ1,02)]/ (1+ω)2 > 1, since δ1,0 > ½.
The derivative of A-9 with respect to µ is strictly positive for µ>0, proving the claim.
c) Magnet Outcome ⇔  UωB2(1) – UωB2(2) = (g1 – g2)(1 – α)/α – g1(σ /α) – ∆⋅ω > 0, for some ω
⇒ g1 – g2 > (α /(1 - α))⋅ (g1(σ /α) + ∆ω) > 0
⇒ g1 > g2
Proposition 2: If mobility is costless (∆ = 0), school quality is the same across schools (ε1 = ε2), there
are different educational preferences across ethnic groups (σ > 0), and ethnic diversity is not beneficial
for educational production  (f′ (γ) ≤ 0 ∀ γ), then there is complete ethnic sorting (δ1 = 1, δ2 = 0).
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Proof:
Prove for f(γ) ≡ 1. The result holds a fortiori for f′ (γ) ≤ 0 ∀ γ.
(*) ε1 = ε2 and f(γ) ≡ 1 ∀ γ ⇒ g1 = g2
(**) ∆ = 0 ⇒ ∆⋅ω = 0 ∀ ω
(*), (**)    ⇒ UωB2(1) – UωB2(2) = – g1(σ /α) < 0 ∀ ω, in Equation 8.
Analogously, UωA1(2) – UωA1(1) = – g2(σ /α) < 0 ∀ ω.
• Multiple Equilibria
A relevant case for multiple equilibria, in the example described in section 3.3, is when γ1 ≥ γ* is
expected in a Magnet Outcome, γ1 < γ* is expected in a Segregation Outcome, and γ2 < γ* is expected
in both cases.
Claim A1: A sufficient condition for multiple equilibria in the example in section 3.3 is:
(ε /ρ)1/(1-α) < 1 –  σ /(1 – α) < ε1/(1-α)
Proof: The Segregation Outcome occurs when
(1 – α)(1 – ε1/(1-α)) < σ (A-13)
Solving (10) and (A13) simultaneously determines the range of multiple equilibria. The condition
implies that ρ>1.
The range of multiple equilibria in Figure A1 is ME. When f′ > 0, inflows of B2 pupils into School 1
make education production more efficient, making School 1 more attractive for other pupils.  The
strategic complementarity generates multiple equilibria.
Figure A1:
The range of multiple equilibria
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